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Introduction 
 
During the post-independence period, greater focus on deepening manufacturing base and the 
foreign exchange constraint forced the country to adopt the policy of import-substitution. As a 
result, inclination towards trade promotion remained limited until eighties. A major proportion of 
India’s trade during this period was directed towards the western and Soviet bloc economies, 
while the importance of the Asian partners in overall trade basket were only moderate. In 
particular, while India’s path crossed with the Southeast and East Asian economies through 
international forums like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a long-term strategic partnership 
in trade sphere was broadly missing. Although India became a party to Bangkok Agreement in 
1975, which involved China, South Korea, Lao PDR and Mongolia from the East, the actual 
level of trade integration through tariff reform remained limited.  
 
After the Gulf war, the adverse growth scenario led to introduction of economic liberalization 
policies in India from 1991 onwards. As a result of embracing the export-promotion led growth 
model, the need to identify the potential target markets were strongly felt. In this background, the 
country adopted the ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) during nineties with a two-track approach in mind. 
While on one hand, Japan, Singapore and South Korea were considered as appropriate sources of 
advanced technology and investment, high growth rates in several economies of East and 
Southeast Asia were instrumental in considering them as high potential export markets. India 
subsequently strengthened its ties with the ‘East’ by becoming Sectoral Dialogue Partner of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1992, covering trade, tourism, investment 
and science and technology. In the new millennium, the ties with the region has been 
strengthened through a number of regional trade agreements (RTAs), namely, India-Singapore 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) (2005), India-South Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) (2009), India-ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) (2010), India-Japan CEPA (2011), India-Malaysia CECA (2011). Also 
negotiation on other preferential agreements involving East Asian and Pacific economies are 
presently going on. These initiatives signify the growing recognition of the region’s importance 
in India’s development path.  
 
India’s engagement with the region has deepened further through the introduction of the ‘Act 
East Policy’ (AEP) that has come into effect when Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi at his 
maiden visit to ASEAN-India Summit in 2014 emphasized on practicing more action-oriented 
policy towards ASEAN and the wider East Asia. In technical terms, AEP may not be considered 
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as a strict foreign policy shift. It can be termed as continuation and further deepening of the LEP 
launched in the past decade. However, the significance of this initiative with renewed focus on 
the region comes from two aspects. First, while in nineties, India merely looked at the ‘East’ as a 
lucrative market, the urge to link up with the international production networks (IPNs) prevalent 
in East and Southeast Asia, particularly for sourcing quality raw materials and parts and 
components, is far stronger in the recent period. In addition, investment expectations from the 
region, particularly from Australia, Japan, South Korea and Singapore have also played a key 
role in formulation of AEP. Second, while India’s engagement with Southeast Asia continue to 
focus on deepening trade-investment interrelationship, under the present NDA government, the 
country has emerged as the net security provider of the region. In 2015, the Prime Minister 
visited five East Asian countries at various occasions and the discussions covered both economic 
and security dimensions. There have been other high level diplomatic visits to the ‘East’, 
subsequently followed by the appropriate diplomatic channels. In line with the ongoing 
engagement, India’s Republic Day celebration in 2018 was marked with the presence of all ten 
ASEAN head of states (Roche, 2018). Therefore, AEP has brought a great sense of speed and 
priority in engaging with the East Asian countries in general and Southeast Asia in particular.  
 
The current paper examines the opportunities that this new narrative offers for India-East 
Asia relations in days to come, especially in the current geo-political set-up. At the end, it 
attempts to seek answers to India’s drive towards greater linkages with this Asian sub-region, 
both in economic and strategic platforms. 
 
Emerging Trade Engagements and Expectations 
 
The existing literature indicates that enhanced trade relationship through agreements 
facilitate deeper integration between partners. Over time India’s trade dependence with East and 
Southeast Asia has deepened significantly, particularly China emerging as a major trade partner. 
ASEAN-India FTA (2010) has come into force as the biggest trade engagement of the country so 
far. India’s RTA engagements with ASEAN countries started with launching of the Early 
Harvest Programme (EHP) under the Indo-Thai FTA (2004) and subsequent signing of the Indo-
Singapore CECA (2005). In addition, the Indo-Malaysia CECA (2011) has been implemented 
after 2010 and Indo-Indonesia CECA is being negotiated. In recognition of the underlying 
economic advantage, Indian infrastructure augmentation initiatives over the last couple of years 
has attempted to improve connectivity with ASEAN countries (Bhattacharyya and Chakraborty, 
2011: 114-115). 
 
Received wisdom suggested that once the ASEAN-India FTA in merchandise trade is 
launched, negotiations for the Indo-ASEAN CECA (covering both trade in services and 
investment flows) would begin. However, differences witnessed during the negotiations over 
several issues, namely - sequencing of tariff reforms, coverage of negative list and sensitive 
items (particularly in agriculture), rules of origin (ROO) provisions, lowering tariff on primary 
commodities like refined palm oil (Chakraborty and Sengupta, 2010: 221-22), caused both sides 
to move slowly on that front.  
 
The obstacles in moving towards a successful CECA with ASEAN countries so far remain a 
challenge, as inclusion of trade in services is expected to help India to capitalize its inherent 
advantages. The country has a moderately high export complementarity index in services trade 
with the ASEAN countries, and the formation of the CECA is likely to benefit Indian service 
exporters considerably (Chakraborty and Bhattacharyya, 2014: 32). In addition, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows from ASEAN countries in the post-bloc period, notably from Singapore, 
was anticipated to play a key role in transferring latest technologies. Similar undercurrents 
played a role in entering Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with Japan 
and South Korea as well. For instance, Japan is set to support a number of key infrastructure 
initiatives like Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, Chennai-Bangalore Industrial Corridor, while 
similar participation in India’s North-Eastern states would be preferred (Rajendram, 2014: 7). 
The aforesaid economic corridors are expected to significantly influence maturity of the recently 
launched ‘Make in India’ initiative, and crucially augment India’s exports both to the ‘East’ as 
well as the ‘West’.  
 
During the Indo-ASEAN FTA negotiation, Indian policymakers had to focus upon the 
potential implications of imports from ASEAN on several sensitive sectors, namely, fisheries, 
plantations, oilseeds, automobiles etc. India expected to compensate the potential adverse effects 
of imports on domestic sector through rising exports to ASEAN on one hand, and deepen 
participation in Asian international production networks (IPNs) with the parts and components 
imports from ASEAN, on the other (Chakraborty, 2014: 262). This in turn would help large 
Indian manufacturing firms to augment their competitiveness in the global market. Conversely, 
strategically located Indian Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) would incrementally be able to 
join the ASEAN production networks as suppliers, by proving their efficiency in terms of price 
and quality parameters.  
 
Within ASEAN the IPNs are already deep-rooted, with individual countries increasingly 
specializing in narrow set of product lines as per their comparative advantage. For instance, in 
automobile products Thailand specializes in engine and electronic parts, Philippines specializes 
in fuel system and suspension parts, Malaysia specializes in bumper and drive shaft, while 
Indonesia specializes in engine valves and steering handle (WTO, 2011: 16), making the final 
assembled automobile products truly regional (i.e., ‘ASEAN’) in nature. After the initial 
processing of the raw material in the country of origin to reduce bulkiness, the intermediate 
products are brought to the country with best capabilities for speedy and cost-efficient 
assembling (for instance, Thailand), and also from where the product can be exported outside 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with greater ease. The expansion of the ASEAN IPNs have 
crucially benefitted from the AFTA tariff liberalizations as intra-region trade flows in semi-
finished and final products increased through zero percent tariff on partner exports (UNESCAP, 
2011), and the deepened connectivity linkages by land, sea and air routes (ADB, 2009: 8-10). As 
a result, multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Japan and South Korea have benefitted from 
fragmentation of their production process in sequential production blocks, which is spread across 
ASEAN partners (Lim and Kimura, 2015: 143-48). In addition to the general rise in trade flows, 
such fragmentation has significantly contributed to the cross-border technology spillover.    
 
The production integration of two partner countries across sectors can be identified with the 
help of Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) index. Comparing the indices for 2011 and 2013, Chakraborty 
(2016: 51-52) notes that intra-ASEAN trade is becoming increasingly integrated as the IIT index 
is rising for most of the country-pairs over 2011 to 2013. The IITs are particularly high for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The result indicates that the 
firms located within these economies are increasingly trading among themselves in semi-finished 
products and parts and components, essentially to exploit the labour cost and raw material 
availability related advantages, ease of exporting etc. However, there is considerable scope for 
expanding participation of Indian firms in ASEAN IPNs Chakraborty (2016: 51-52). The success 
of AEP on economic front would be reflected through India’s success in enhancing its 
participation level at the ASEAN IPNs.  
 
ASEAN’s IPNs also involve six of their bilateral regional trade partners, namely - Australia, 
New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea, through closer integration in trade and 
investment sphere. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was launched in 
2012, involving ASEAN and these six countries. The underlying objective has been to ensure 
seamless flow of goods, services and investment in a wider region of South, East and Southeast 
Asia and the Pacific. Most of the RCEP countries are already partnering each other through 
bilateral arrangements, e.g., India-Korea CEPA, India-Japan CEPA, Australia-Japan FTA, 
Australia-Korea FTA etc. Also several bilateral negotiations are going on (e.g. India-Australia 
FTA, Japan-Korea FTA, China-Japan FTA), while Australia-China FTA has been signed and 
will come into effect subsequently. It is expected that the participation by India in RCEP would 
enhance trade in general and IIT type trade in particular, thereby deepening India’s presence in 
regional value chains (Das and Dubey, 2014: 26). The potential for IPN participation is 
particularly high for India in sectors like textiles, leather, footwear and food products etc. (Palit, 
2014a: 35). It is further expected that the deepened IPN integration through RCEP and 
consequent welfare enhancement would enable member countries to effectively implement a 
strong trade facilitation agreement (Palit, 2014a: 35). 
 
Fulfillment of India’s AEP agenda would crucially depend on effective addressing of several 
RCEP related challenges in coming days. First and foremost, the coverage of the agreement and 
future reform agenda under RCEP, which crucially depend on the political economy, is an 
important consideration from Indian perspective. China, given its orientation towards export of 
both high and low-tech manufacturing products, is interested to focus on liberalization of trade in 
goods. However Japan, as a major provider of FDI to the East and Southeast Asia, 
understandably wants the reform agendas to include trade-investment and intellectual property 
rights (IPR) related provisions as well. If these two non-trade areas are included in the reform 
agenda, Japan would be able to put China in a defensive position (Hamanaka, 2014: 10). While 
India is open to the question of including trade-investment related provisions in trade agreements 
(Chakraborty and Kedia, 2014), the country would prefer to ensure that in the IPR agreement no 
‘TRIPS-Plus’ provision is included. Second, in comparison among all the six bilateral trade 
agreements of ASEAN, the liberalizations under the India-ASEAN FTA in merchandise products 
is relatively less deeper due to the presence of a large negative list and ‘sensitive’ products. As 
the other five countries have already expanded the level of market access in their FTAs with 
ASEAN, the pressure on India to implement relatively greater liberalisation measures in course 
of RCEP reforms will be intense (Palit, 2014b: 3). India in particular also needs to ensure 
survival of its SME firms, spread across manufacturing segment, as onslaught of more 
competitive Chinese firms may pose a serious challenge to their operation. 
 
In Table 1, India’s merchandise trade scenario with the ‘East’ over 2001-17 has been 
summarized. For understanding the evolving trade pattern, the entire period is divided in three 
sub-periods, namely, 2001-05, 2006-10 and 2011-17. A couple of interesting observations 
emerges from the table. First, Indian trade balance is in surplus only with respect to seven 
partners – Cambodia, Hong Kong, North Korea, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. 
The list includes a number of smaller economies, which requires the attention of the 
policymakers. Second, apart from Singapore, India is having negative trade balance with all 
other ‘comprehensive’ trade partners (i.e., Japan, Malaysia and South Korea). In other words, the 
inclusion of trade in services and investment in the agreement have not improved the 
merchandise trade scenario so far, through the much-expected technology spillover effect. Third, 
vis-à-vis ASEAN partners, India is having trade surplus only with Cambodia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Vietnam. Trade deficit with all the other six countries is widening over the period, 
which is another major area of concern. This implies that while post-2010, India’s exports to 
ASEAN has increased, the imports have grown at a higher rate. The finding underlines the need 
to conduct a detailed competitiveness analysis for Indian exports vis-à-vis the ASEAN partners. 
Also the tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by ASEAN on Indian exports needs to be 
investigated. Finally, it can be observed that India’s trade balance with respect to the proposed 
RCEP members, i.e., the five bilateral FTA partners of ASEAN, is in deficit and widening over 
the period. The quantum of the deficit is growing particularly sharply for China. The past 
experience of moderate export success through tariff reforms in the ‘East’ and the ASEAN 
market in particular, is perhaps playing a role behind the cautious approach adopted by India at 
the ongoing RCEP negotiations. 
 
As noted earlier, one of the major expectation for India from the integration with ASEAN is 
to develop a deeper association with the IPNs located in these economies. In Tables 2-6, the 
regional production contribution in five select industries is compared over 2002-2011 by drawing 
data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Trade in 
Value-Added (TIVA) database on origin of value added in gross exports. While exporting a final 
product, a country may source the necessary raw materials and the parts and components either 
from within the nation or from abroad and undertake the necessary value addition on them before 
export. Rise in the domestic value added (i.e., rise in percentage contribution of a country in own 
exports) implies strengthening of the domestic supplier network (backward integration) and 
hence competitiveness, while a decline in the same implies that the exporters are increasingly 
relying on the imported raw materials, parts and components and service link supports from 
abroad. The latter then indicates greater integration with regional IPNs. The Indian export 
scenario is compared here with seven ‘Eastern’ economies (China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand), and the source of value addition for their exports in five 
product categories provides interesting insights.  
 
Table 2 shows the scenario for the basic metal and fabricated metal products. It is observed 
that domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore while the 
same has declined in the other four countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports 
have increased for India and Thailand, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea.  
 
Table 3 indicates the scenario for computer, electronic and optical equipment. It is seen that 
domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore while the same 
has declined in the other four countries. Contribution of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) countries in total exports have increased for India, while integration within ASEAN 
have deepened for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
Table 4 reveals the scenario for electrical machinery and apparatus. It is noted that domestic 
contribution has increased in China, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand while the same has 
declined in the other four countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have 
increased for India and Thailand, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for Indonesia, 
Singapore and Thailand. 
 
Table 5 depicts the scenario for textiles, leather and footwear products. It is observed that 
domestic contribution has increased in China and Indonesia while the same has declined in the 
other six countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have increased for India 
while integration within ASEAN have deepened for China and Indonesia. 
 
Table 6 summarizes the scenario for the transport equipment sector. It can be seen that 
domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia and Singapore while the same has 
declined in the other five countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have 
increased for India, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. 
 
A couple of general observations can also be drawn from the value addition dynamics at the 
sectoral level in the selected countries. First, the percentage value contribution of Japan is 
declining in almost all the country’s exports in the selected sectors. Second, the percentage value 
contribution of China is rising in nearly all cases. These two observations clearly explains why 
Japan is interested to incorporate investment and IPR provisions within RCEP, while China is 
not so excited with this idea. Third, the contribution of EU and US in the export of the select 
East and Southeast Asian countries is generally going down over the period under consideration. 
A similar scenario is noted for the OECD countries as well. Fourth, for India the contribution of 
the OECD countries as well as the same from the EU and US have however increased in several 
product categories (e.g., textile, leather and footwear), which goes against the trend for ‘East’ 
countries. This signifies that while the production integration in most the ‘East’ economies are 
witnessing integration within the region, for India the value addition from economies in the 
‘West’ are still important for its exports. The linkage is particularly important because of the fact 
that while the East and Southeast Asian countries have significantly benefitted from the Japanese 
‘Flying Geese’ type investment in the past, which deepened the production network among the 
recipient countries (Hayter and Edgington, 2004). India on the other hand has received 
significant amount of FDI from European countries and US in the manufacturing sectors, which 
has facilitated a closer link with them instead. 
Table 1: India’s Trade Scenario with the ‘East’ (2001-2014) in US $ Million 
 
Partner Name 
Export Import Trade Balance 
2001-05 2006-10 2011-17 2001-05 2006-10 2011-17 2001-05 2006-10 2011-17 
Australia 586.26 1275.62 2694.19 2615.17 9566.07 10767.67 -2028.91 -8290.45 -8073.48 
Brunei Darussalam 4.21 23.39 155.82 0.45 296.37 682.02 3.77 -272.97 -526.20 
Cambodia 17.18 49.88 118.97 0.55 3.68 24.59 16.63 46.20 94.38 
China 3260.72 11045.02 12698.81 4856.17 28732.67 56780.43 -1595.45 -17687.65 -44081.62 
Hong Kong, China 3189.71 6751.56 12534.39 1336.59 4671.40 7805.86 1853.12 2080.16 4728.52 
Indonesia 976.33 2793.48 4453.31 1911.30 6435.42 13786.48 -934.97 -3641.94 -9333.17 
Japan 1870.18 3542.52 5250.16 2580.31 6662.93 10210.33 -710.13 -3120.40 -4960.17 
Korea, Democratic People's Republic 
of (North Korea)  139.37 518.91 133.37 3.91 181.32 58.27 135.46 337.59 75.10 
Korea, Republic of (South Korea) 846.68 3192.91 4018.46 2515.69 7366.46 12814.85 -1669.01 -4173.56 -8796.39 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 3.16 9.00 36.99 0.09 4.26 121.60 3.07 4.74 -84.62 
Macao, China 2.57 10.74 2.28 3.37 0.26 3.97 -0.80 10.49 -1.70 
Malaysia 901.60 2659.21 4391.12 1805.52 5765.81 9234.02 -903.93 -3106.60 -4842.90 
Mongolia 0.98 9.61 16.40 0.34 6.82 8.11 0.65 2.79 8.29 
Myanmar 87.63 200.99 754.45 392.67 944.40 1149.53 -305.04 -743.41 -395.09 
New Zealand 87.81 253.54 291.23 107.82 422.22 609.95 -20.01 -168.68 -318.72 
Papua New Guinea 8.61 16.05 38.38 31.77 182.24 167.64 -23.16 -166.19 -129.26 
Philippines 373.69 684.44 1287.27 141.29 269.47 475.31 232.39 414.97 811.96 
Singapore 2570.46 7453.00 10817.40 2041.41 6759.14 7059.89 529.06 693.86 3757.51 
Taipei, Chinese 525.39 1548.77 2243.91 851.12 2537.32 3889.77 -325.73 -988.55 -1645.85 
Thailand 797.47 1776.00 3218.59 655.14 2624.93 5391.02 142.33 -848.94 -2172.43 
Timor-Leste 1.06 108.12 3.31 0.01 0.36 3.39 1.05 107.76 -0.08 
Viet Nam 413.91 1647.46 5290.29 55.92 424.20 2597.51 358.00 1223.26 2692.78 
Source: Constructed by the authors from Trade Map database (undated)
Table 2: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
(in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 
China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 61.41 0.40 1.56 0.61 1.78 2.22 1.98 1.53 
India 0.25 75.33 0.63 0.06 0.65 0.68 0.24 0.39 
Indonesia 0.55 0.14 66.79 0.58 1.58 3.18 0.98 0.78 
Japan 7.83 0.74 6.04 88.81 16.50 11.90 7.14 11.99 
Malaysia 0.53 0.22 1.13 0.25 41.69 3.17 0.55 1.07 
Philippines 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.23 0.30 0.17 0.20 
Singapore 0.37 0.19 1.51 0.08 2.49 46.78 0.22 0.79 
South 
Korea 
2.59 0.31 1.56 0.41 2.39 1.78 65.15 1.10 
Thailand 0.38 0.12 0.59 0.11 1.25 1.03 0.15 56.54 
Vietnam 0.23 0.02 0.27 0.06 0.43 0.18 0.14 0.27 
APEC 85.47 5.18 86.39 94.55 82.50 84.95 85.91 82.77 
ASEAN 2.27 0.70 70.41 1.22 47.76 54.71 2.34 60.02 
EU 28 5.12 4.95 4.11 1.25 8.05 8.94 3.73 5.13 
United 
States 
3.00 1.22 2.28 1.10 4.76 8.17 2.91 2.24 
OECD 
Members 
21.95 9.37 17.49 93.32 38.60 35.47 84.06 24.68 
 2011 
 China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 67.48 2.79 1.64 1.89 6.01 4.28 5.77 5.30 
India 0.78 59.78 0.53 0.23 1.51 1.63 0.94 0.85 
Indonesia 0.92 0.89 76.25 1.45 3.97 3.79 1.99 2.79 
Japan 2.87 1.21 1.83 78.49 8.52 4.16 6.33 11.87 
Malaysia 0.42 0.45 1.47 0.49 44.26 1.80 0.64 1.31 
Philippines 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.22 0.51 
Singapore 0.26 0.34 0.53 0.13 1.75 48.55 0.27 0.75 
South 
Korea 
1.20 0.73 0.80 1.02 2.29 1.24 49.72 2.54 
Thailand 0.23 0.29 0.40 0.23 1.32 0.61 0.26 37.23 
Vietnam 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.51 0.20 0.26 0.39 
APEC 83.14 13.66 87.31 90.06 80.24 73.99 77.33 78.40 
ASEAN 2.21 2.22 79.76 2.75 52.28 55.32 3.88 43.18 
EU 28 4.15 5.27 1.39 1.61 6.21 7.66 4.05 4.99 
United 
States 
1.72 1.76 0.66 1.13 3.22 4.20 2.54 2.83 
OECD 
Members 
15.40 13.05 6.26 85.63 25.77 21.31 69.32 31.12 
Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated) 
 Table 3: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 
(in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 
China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 22.56 0.40 0.81 0.52 1.33 1.35 1.10 1.63 
India 0.27 78.79 0.47 0.05 0.48 0.33 0.16 0.40 
Indonesia 0.85 0.13 72.24 0.23 1.17 2.02 0.49 0.81 
Japan 20.99 0.95 4.86 89.84 19.04 11.89 11.14 18.27 
Malaysia 1.70 0.24 0.92 0.40 29.80 3.96 1.06 2.73 
Philippines 0.62 0.02 0.08 0.19 1.21 0.78 0.47 1.02 
Singapore 1.57 0.27 1.79 0.28 5.02 47.14 0.98 2.92 
South 
Korea 
6.05 0.36 1.42 0.79 
3.46 2.14 62.52 2.98 
Thailand 0.93 0.13 0.55 0.18 1.23 1.06 0.30 39.09 
Vietnam 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.06 0.25 
APEC 78.42 5.62 89.62 96.80 83.92 86.93 91.16 86.16 
ASEAN 5.84 0.82 75.72 1.33 38.67 55.07 3.42 46.95 
EU 28 16.23 5.14 5.53 1.77 11.30 8.93 4.84 8.21 
United 
States 
10.59 1.36 3.50 2.66 
14.53 11.29 8.97 10.80 
OECD 
Members 
57.98 9.88 17.92 95.95 
51.42 37.70 89.66 43.31 
 2011 
 China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 45.01 5.10 5.16 3.95 9.21 3.99 7.71 10.97 
India 0.78 68.81 1.05 0.20 1.05 1.69 0.56 1.06 
Indonesia 0.80 0.51 72.89 0.53 1.54 1.13 0.83 1.46 
Japan 10.62 1.81 3.45 82.82 10.43 3.85 7.33 13.88 
Malaysia 1.96 0.58 0.94 0.43 33.17 1.37 0.74 2.39 
Philippines 0.89 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.67 0.54 0.42 0.85 
Singapore 1.43 0.83 1.52 0.32 5.37 59.87 1.28 2.12 
South 
Korea 
6.35 1.12 1.61 0.99 
3.15 1.65 57.77 2.81 
Thailand 1.01 0.37 0.74 0.29 1.48 0.50 0.40 34.75 
Vietnam 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.34 0.12 0.19 0.47 
APEC 83.38 16.59 91.37 94.41 82.37 84.04 87.18 83.30 
ASEAN 6.36 2.68 76.61 1.92 42.61 63.57 3.93 42.13 
EU 28 9.03 6.27 3.63 2.28 10.08 8.09 5.64 7.58 
United 
States 
5.51 2.89 1.89 2.31 
10.22 6.49 5.21 5.89 
OECD 
Members 
35.52 14.52 12.30 90.03 
37.18 23.52 78.97 34.76 
Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated) 
 Table 4: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Electrical machinery and apparatus 
(in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 
China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 31.80 0.38 1.06 0.47 1.53 1.81 1.20 2.16 
India 0.34 80.51 0.69 0.04 0.52 0.44 0.48 0.43 
Indonesia 0.96 0.12 68.79 0.23 1.60 3.46 0.38 0.94 
Japan 15.23 0.86 5.36 92.51 16.01 10.27 7.20 15.20 
Malaysia 0.97 0.21 1.15 0.23 39.38 3.24 0.53 1.94 
Philippines 0.31 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.67 0.46 0.20 0.54 
Singapore 0.78 0.25 2.02 0.14 3.71 45.64 0.48 2.07 
South 
Korea 4.99 0.33 1.46 0.45 2.67 1.38 73.08 1.87 
Thailand 0.82 0.12 0.82 0.16 1.43 1.81 0.28 45.87 
Vietnam 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.06 0.87 
APEC 77.25 5.19 88.12 97.22 83.79 82.44 91.32 82.30 
ASEAN 4.07 0.74 73.03 0.91 47.09 54.80 1.97 52.39 
EU 28 13.15 4.82 5.34 1.35 10.24 12.62 4.92 10.59 
United 
States 7.23 1.31 3.73 1.62 9.23 8.84 5.05 4.77 
OECD 
Members 45.94 9.20 18.68 96.72 42.44 37.05 92.23 35.79 
 2011 
 China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 51.38 3.52 3.53 3.24 8.07 6.38 6.58 7.94 
India 1.04 66.04 1.07 0.20 1.45 1.48 0.93 0.88 
Indonesia 0.82 0.58 74.23 0.67 3.12 3.96 1.01 1.89 
Japan 7.98 1.39 2.71 84.49 9.20 4.72 5.76 10.42 
Malaysia 0.94 0.43 1.14 0.34 37.78 2.28 0.51 1.91 
Philippines 0.42 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.47 0.59 0.23 0.66 
Singapore 0.66 0.46 1.22 0.19 3.03 47.45 0.44 0.93 
South 
Korea 3.68 0.89 1.42 0.86 2.65 1.66 61.71 2.20 
Thailand 0.67 0.34 1.00 0.35 1.93 0.87 0.32 46.58 
Vietnam 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.44 0.27 0.22 0.43 
APEC 79.44 14.11 90.39 94.50 80.15 78.89 85.33 83.06 
ASEAN 3.75 2.08 78.09 2.01 46.86 55.48 2.84 52.50 
EU 28 10.49 6.09 3.01 2.09 8.68 10.80 5.01 7.19 
United 
States 3.96 2.29 1.78 1.65 5.86 6.10 3.33 3.24 
OECD 
Members 31.83 13.87 10.90 90.66 31.20 27.17 79.63 27.66 
Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated) 
 Table 5: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear (in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 
China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 61.82 0.32 0.96 3.24 2.52 4.69 2.91 1.44 
India 0.55 90.40 0.49 0.14 1.35 1.67 0.68 0.57 
Indonesia 0.65 0.10 78.15 0.31 2.54 5.31 0.87 0.51 
Japan 7.26 0.30 2.65 88.72 6.61 3.93 3.35 3.27 
Malaysia 0.51 0.13 0.69 0.15 55.86 7.66 0.37 0.58 
Philippines 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.09 
Singapore 0.39 0.16 1.09 0.09 3.06 44.83 0.26 0.74 
South 
Korea 6.47 0.24 2.75 0.82 2.04 2.51 76.06 1.16 
Thailand 0.50 0.11 0.53 0.20 1.83 1.74 0.27 78.26 
Vietnam 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.33 0.42 0.12 0.18 
APEC 90.21 2.97 92.79 96.28 87.18 84.74 90.15 92.09 
ASEAN 2.27 0.53 80.67 0.95 63.91 60.86 2.04 80.48 
EU 28 4.85 1.96 2.86 2.20 6.50 8.66 3.89 3.64 
United 
States 3.78 0.72 2.30 1.56 4.95 6.07 3.41 2.60 
OECD 
Members 24.61 4.00 12.23 93.94 23.02 24.01 88.41 12.23 
 2011 
 China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 73.52 2.57 2.80 9.88 10.61 11.91 6.29 3.76 
India 0.86 80.17 0.57 0.37 2.23 2.40 0.82 1.14 
Indonesia 0.66 0.39 81.75 0.68 2.66 3.41 1.25 0.91 
Japan 2.62 0.65 1.04 76.03 4.25 2.43 3.64 2.38 
Malaysia 0.45 0.30 0.78 0.30 50.76 2.88 0.47 0.77 
Philippines 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.19 
Singapore 0.35 0.51 0.75 0.18 2.28 44.23 0.40 0.88 
South 
Korea 2.08 0.49 1.94 0.72 1.34 1.27 64.66 0.84 
Thailand 0.58 0.32 0.52 0.34 1.82 1.00 0.37 74.13 
Vietnam 0.28 0.05 0.17 0.35 0.79 0.46 0.51 0.30 
APEC 87.93 9.51 93.23 92.55 83.94 75.44 85.59 89.28 
ASEAN 2.49 1.73 84.29 2.05 58.72 52.34 3.32 77.24 
EU 28 4.72 3.99 1.64 3.28 6.73 13.73 4.64 3.71 
United 
States 2.82 2.14 0.94 1.86 3.67 3.53 3.38 1.90 
OECD 
Members 14.63 8.91 6.76 83.43 18.99 24.06 79.49 10.91 
Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated) 
 Table 6: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Transport EquipmentSector (in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 
China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 57.38 0.40 0.87 0.43 1.14 1.04 1.24 1.16 
India 0.18 80.81 0.32 0.04 0.45 0.26 0.24 0.37 
Indonesia 0.38 0.11 72.54 0.21 1.06 1.53 0.54 0.70 
Japan 10.18 1.04 6.34 91.72 12.20 8.77 7.45 21.50 
Malaysia 0.52 0.19 0.95 0.18 53.69 1.94 0.50 1.22 
Philippines 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.25 0.19 0.17 1.01 
Singapore 0.48 0.26 2.04 0.12 2.46 56.23 0.39 1.32 
South 
Korea 2.48 0.32 0.92 0.41 3.20 3.93 70.97 1.39 
Thailand 0.39 0.12 0.38 0.15 0.95 0.50 0.18 48.75 
Vietnam 0.11 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.26 
APEC 84.95 5.72 89.60 96.53 87.42 88.56 90.33 85.70 
ASEAN 2.05 0.71 76.26 0.80 58.63 60.54 1.92 53.41 
EU 28 9.76 4.52 3.00 2.08 7.58 8.04 4.52 8.14 
United 
States 5.56 1.75 2.80 1.98 7.32 10.98 5.00 3.94 
OECD 
Members 31.03 9.33 14.90 96.98 33.82 33.84 90.87 37.76 
 2011 
 China India Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore South 
Korea 
Thailand 
China 70.03 3.67 3.04 2.37 6.61 3.47 5.70 5.46 
India 0.52 68.00 0.72 0.18 1.22 1.15 0.68 0.98 
Indonesia 0.45 0.52 75.91 0.57 2.74 0.92 0.89 2.33 
Japan 5.16 1.49 4.50 85.77 8.28 2.57 6.27 13.48 
Malaysia 0.43 0.39 0.69 0.28 46.79 1.05 0.44 1.30 
Philippines 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.19 0.38 0.24 0.18 1.04 
Singapore 0.38 0.51 0.92 0.17 2.01 60.73 0.39 1.22 
South 
Korea 2.01 0.99 1.11 0.65 2.10 4.17 62.04 2.23 
Thailand 0.33 0.32 1.65 0.31 2.24 0.26 0.29 45.12 
Vietnam 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.47 0.09 0.21 0.34 
APEC 86.27 13.89 92.52 94.17 81.84 84.38 84.89 82.97 
ASEAN 1.89 1.98 79.65 1.69 54.69 63.32 2.49 51.47 
EU 28 7.94 6.38 3.05 2.57 9.07 9.40 6.39 6.78 
United 
States 2.77 2.41 1.83 1.66 4.61 7.73 3.81 3.03 
OECD 
Members 20.86 14.19 12.15 92.10 27.84 26.71 82.02 30.68 
Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated) 
 
Maritime Security Cooperation 
 
In addition to the economic determinants, greater focus by India through the AEP initiative 
would balance China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With growing volume of 
exports and economic clout, China has over the last decade maintained an assertive standpoint to 
control the maritime trade routes. The assertion has particularly been reflected in terms of its 
border disputes with neighbouring countries, where through a ‘salami-slicing’ strategy it is 
increasingly making maritime territorial claims in both East China and South China Sea since 
late 2013 (O'Rourke, 2015: 24-26). In particular, the US, Japan and other countries have often 
objected to the Chinese practice of reclamation and construction of reefs and artificial islands at 
locations of military and strategic significance in South China Sea, that complicates the security 
architecture in the Asia-Pacific region (Dolven et al., 2015: 2). The neighbouring ASEAN 
countries have expressed both sense of insecurity generated by such actions and concerns over 
destruction of marine environment (Quintos, 2015: 9).  
 
While India is generally supportive of the existing maritime order, the Chinese action and 
policies often destabilize the same (Rehman, 2017). Apart from the muscle flexing in East and 
South China Seas, China has also enhanced its presence in Indian Ocean over the last decade, 
through deepened cooperation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives etc. (Rajendram, 2014: 4) 
under the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ agenda. It has heavily invested in maritime infrastructure of 
partner countries, which gained prominence as ‘string of pearls’ strategy, to contain India. The 
recipients of Chinese investment include Myanmar, deep-sea port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, 
Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan etc. (Marantidou, 2014: 6). 
 
India in the past has attempted not to follow a confrontationist approach against China and 
been careful not to send any signal to this effect. For instance, it earlier preferred not to 
pronounce its views on the South China Sea situation (Rajendram, 2014: 5). However, the 
Chinese approach, if goes undeterred, would considerably hurt Indian interests in long run. In 
recognition of this fact, India is revisiting its perspective on Southeast Asia. For instance in 
recent past, India and Vietnam decided to undertake oil exploration in South China Sea, which 
was strongly protested by China on the ground of infringement on their territorial claims (Jacob 
and Patil, 2011). However, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) chose to conduct oil exploration in 
offshore block 128 despite Chinese protests (Airy and Jacob, 2012). In addition, during US 
President Barak Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, the joint statement mentioned the issue 
of freedom of navigation, especially in South China Sea, much to the displeasure of China 
(Bajpayee, 2015: 122). The country has also increasingly participated in joint naval exercises 
with several countries (e.g., Singapore, Japan) as well as in search and rescue operations with 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia since 1997 (Bajpayee, 2015: 125). It has also included Japan 
in the ‘Malabar’ naval exercises, jointly conducted with the United States earlier, despite China’s 
strong objections (PTI, 2015). 
 
The Indian attempts to deepening maritime security collaborations with willing partners in the 
‘East’ is often termed as a strategy for creating ‘diamond necklace’ against Chinese ‘string of 
pearls’ in the South China Sea (Scott, 2013: 60). For instance, given the tense relationship with 
China, Vietnam has entered into a strategic partnership with India in November 2007 and in 
2011 the ‘Indian Navy offered Vietnamese forces facilities for training and capacity building, 
reportedly in return for berthing rights at Nha Trang’ (Rajendram, 2014: 8). In addition, the 
cooperation discussions also involve possible import of Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles by 
Vietnam from India (Scott, 2013: 61). Indian Navyships also regularly visit Philippines and the 
first meeting of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee between the two countries has been 
conducted in January 2012 (MEA, 2013: 3). In 2012 a trilateral mechanism involving South 
Korea and Japan has been set up (Scott, 2013: 62). Recently in January 2018, during the visit of 
ten ASEAN members’ leaders in New Delhi for India’s Republic Day celebration, maritime 
cooperation under both traditional and non-traditional sphere in a rule-based maritime domain 
received a strong emphasis (Roy Chaudhury, 2018). 
 
It becomes clear from the discussion so far that India is going to play a key role to ensure 
regional stability in Asia and the Pacific in days to come. The process to deepen maritime 
security collaborations with like-minded partners initiated in the new millennium would receive 
a particular boost through the AEP initiative recently launched. The visits by Indian Prime 
Minister Mr. Modi in Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka in 2015 and the promise to deliver 
military and civilian assistance to them is therefore in line with the broader vision of balancing 
China’s deepening influence in Indian Ocean region (Pant, 2015).  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Growing linkages with the East and Southeast Asian and the Pacific countries is mutually 
beneficial for both India and the partners. On economic front, the benefits are derived from three 
channels. First, India’s integration with the Asian production network is on the rise, which is a 
crucial step for enhancing the competitiveness of the domestic manufacturing sector. The success 
of the recent initiatives like ‘Make-in-India’, ‘Skill India’ are therefore crucial in this context. 
Second, there is considerable scope for augmenting export of key services to the ‘East’, given the 
existing trade complementarities. Finally, the FDI inflows from Japan, South Korea and 
Australia are likely to bring in modern technology, thereby creating a technology spillover effect, 
and consequently enhancing industry performance. On maritime security front, India is gradually 
progressing from ship visits and naval exercises with friendly nations to an elevated stage of 
collaborating in defense procurement, including through funding, technology, and technology 
transfers. New Delhi under the Modi government is eventually eyeing for defense exports under 
the aegis of ‘Make in India’ campaign at home. It is undoubtedly boosting Indian Navy’s 
operational deployment and expanding its reach beyond its shore thereby impinging India’s 
interest firmly in Southeast and East Asia. The AEP is therefore actively engaging New Delhi in 
the growth story of the East Asian landmass, in addition to giving a growth impetus to the 
domestic manufacturing sector.  
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